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A Functional Approach to Judicial Review 
of PTAB Rulings on Mixed Questions of 
Law and Fact 
Rebecca S. Eisenberg* 
ABSTRACT: The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (“Federal Circuit”) 
has long relied on active appellate review to bring uniformity and clarity to 
patent law. It initially treated the PTO the same as the federal district courts, 
reviewing its factual findings for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo. 
Following reversal by the Supreme Court in Dickinson v. Zurko, the Federal 
Circuit began giving greater deference to PTO factual findings. But it 
continued to review the PTO’s legal conclusions de novo, while coding an 
expansive list of disputed issues in patent cases as legal conclusions, even 
when they rest on subsidiary factfinding. 
Congress expanded the role of the PTO in adjudicating challenges to patent 
validity in the Leahy–Smith America Invents Act of 2011 (“AIA”), 
authorizing new adjudicatory proceedings before the Patent Trial and Appeal 
Board (“PTAB”) as an alternative to federal district court litigation. The 
AIA provides for Federal Circuit review of PTAB decisions, without specifying 
standards of review. The scope of review could determine the success of these 
proceedings as a quicker, cheaper, and more expert alternative to district court 
litigation of patent challenges. The Federal Circuit applies the same standards 
of review to PTAB decisions in AIA proceedings that it applies to other PTO 
rulings, reviewing legal conclusions de novo and factual findings for 
substantial evidence. It also follows the same characterizations of issues as 
legal or factual that it has long used in the context of court/court review. In 
the past, by maximizing the scope of appellate review, these characterizations 
allowed the Federal Circuit to exercise greater quality control over generalist 
trial courts with limited competence to resolve patent matters. The net benefits 
are more dubious as applied to decisions of expert PTAB panels in AIA 
adjudications. Yet reversal rates at the Federal Circuit are essentially the same 
for PTAB decisions as for decisions of district courts in patent cases, 
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threatening to frustrate a system designed to improve patent quality while 
limiting litigation costs. 
This Essay reconsiders the proper scope of judicial review of PTAB rulings on 
two issues that the Federal Circuit codes as legal conclusions with factual 
underpinnings: nonobviousness and claim interpretation. Drawing on a 
functional approach to judicial review of mixed questions of law and fact, it 
argues for more deferential review of PTAB rulings on nonobviousness and 
claim interpretation given the expertise of the administrative tribunal and the 
case-specificity of the rulings. The Federal Circuit would do better to confine 
de novo review to generalizable legal rulings that provide guidance in future 
matters rather than replicating the work of the PTAB from the appellate bench 
on routine case-specific rulings. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
During the heyday of Chevron deference to agencies’ interpretations of 
the laws they administer,1 the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 
(“Federal Circuit”) took a notably less deferential approach toward the Patent 
and Trademark Office (“PTO”).2 Treating the PTO the same as federal 
district courts, the Federal Circuit reviewed its factual findings for clear error 
and its legal conclusions de novo.3  
 
 1. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984). 
 2. See Stuart Minor Benjamin & Arti K. Rai, Who’s Afraid of the APA? What the Patent System 
Can Learn from Administrative Law, 95 GEO. L.J. 269, 299–300 (2007); John M. Golden, Working 
Without Chevron: The PTO as Prime Mover, 65 DUKE L.J. 1657, 1672–73 (2016); Jonathan S. Masur, 
Regulating Patents, 2010 SUP. CT. REV. 275, 277; Sarah Tran, Administrative Law, Patents, and 
Distorted Rules, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 831, 834–35 (2012); Melissa F. Wasserman, The Changing 
Guard of Patent Law: Chevron Deference for the PTO, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1959, 1975 (2013). 
 3. See, e.g., In re Alton, 76 F.3d 1168, 1172 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (“We review questions of fact 
arising from Board rejections under a clearly erroneous standard. . . . We review questions of law 
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The Supreme Court held that the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) 
requires greater deference to PTO factual findings in its 1999 decision in 
Dickinson v. Zurko.4 After that, the Federal Circuit recited that it reviews such 
findings for “substantial evidence” in the administrative record rather than 
for clear error.5 But it continued to review the PTO’s conclusions of law de 
novo, reasoning that Chevron deference was not appropriate because the 
Patent Act did not give the PTO rulemaking authority over substantive issues 
of patent law.6 Meanwhile, the Federal Circuit defined an expanding list of 
disputed issues in patent matters as questions of law.7 
A potential game changer occurred in 2011 when Congress expanded 
the PTO’s authority to engage in both rulemaking and adjudication in the 
Leahy–Smith America Invents Act (“AIA”).8 Concerned about the impact of 
patents of dubious validity on innovation, Congress sought to provide a 
quicker, cheaper, and more expert alternative to federal district courts for 
adjudicating validity challenges.9 The AIA authorizes the PTO to resolve such 
challenges in adjudicatory proceedings before the Patent Trial and Appeal 
Board (“PTAB”),10 and to prescribe regulations for the conduct of these 
proceedings.11 Some commentators argue that these new delegations of 
authority call for greater deference to the PTO’s interpretations of ambiguous 
 
de novo.”); In re King, 801 F.2d 1324, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (“[A]nticipation is a fact question 
subject to review under the clearly erroneous standard. . . . [The analysis] is the same whether it 
was made by the [PTO B]oard or by a district court.”). 
 4. See Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 163–65 (1999). 
 5. See, e.g., In re Gartside, 203 F.3d 1305, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 
 6. E.g., In re Swanson, 540 F.3d 1368, 1374 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“[T]he Board’s statutory 
interpretation in a particular case is given no deference . . . .”). On procedural matters, the 
Federal Circuit deferred to the PTO’s interpretations through rulemaking authorized by statute. 
35 U.S.C. § 2(b)(2) (2012); Cooper Techs. Co. v. Dudas, 536 F.3d 1330, 1335–40 (Fed. Cir. 
2008) (discussing availability of continuation applications).  
 7. See Paul R. Gugliuzza, The Federal Circuit as a Federal Court, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1791, 
1831 (2013) (noting the Federal Circuit has enhanced its authority over district courts by casting 
important issues as questions of law); Arti K. Rai, Engaging Facts and Policy: A Multi-Institutional 
Approach to Patent System Reform, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1035, 1065–66 (2003) (arguing that Federal 
Circuit decisions to limit deference to district courts and the PTO may reflect lack of confidence 
in the competence of these institutions to decide issues correctly). 
 8. Leahy–Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (codified 
in scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.). 
 9. Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Giving the Federal Circuit a Run for Its Money: Challenging Patents 
in the PTAB, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 235, 235–36 (2015). 
 10. See Leahy–Smith America Invents Act § 7(a). These new adjudicatory proceedings 
include post-grant review proceedings (“PGR”) to adjudicate any available ground of invalidity 
during the first nine months after a patent issues. Id. § 6(d). They also include inter partes review 
proceedings (“IPR(s)”) after the nine-month PGR period has expired to adjudicate challenges 
based on prior art consisting of patents or printed publications. Id. § 6(a). Finally, these 
proceedings include a transitional program to review the validity of covered business method 
patents (“CBM”) on expanded grounds. Id. § 18(a). 
 11. Id. § 7(a). 
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provisions in the Patent Act.12 On the other hand, some Federal Circuit judges 
argue that administrative factfinding in the AIA PTAB proceedings should get 
less deference than the Supreme Court required in Dickinson v. Zurko.13 
An important category of PTAB determinations falls outside much of this 
discourse: rulings that apply general legal standards to particular cases. 
Arguably such rulings amount to statutory gap-filling under implicit 
delegation of authority to the PTO from Congress, and are thus entitled to 
Chevron deference.14 But the Federal Circuit calls these determinations 
“conclusions of law” and reviews them de novo.15 In their specificity and 
grounding in the evidence, these “legal conclusions” resemble fact finding 
more than statutory interpretation, and they may indeed rest on subsidiary 
findings that the Federal Circuit codes as factual.16 The Federal Circuit recites 
that it reviews the underlying factual findings for substantial evidence, while 
it reviews the ultimate rulings de novo.  
Such issues predominate in inter partes review proceedings (“IPR(s)”), 
which account for more than 90% of filings to date seeking AIA adjudications 
before the PTAB.17 Although the PTAB may consider a broader set of issues 
in other proceedings, the AIA limits the use of IPRs to challenges under 
sections 102 and 103 of the Patent Act (i.e., lack of novelty and obviousness) 
based on prior art consisting of patents and printed publications.18 Both 
determinations compare the challenged patent claim(s) to the prior art, often 
raising disputes about the meaning of the claim language.19 Most IPRs thus 
 
 12. See, e.g., Stuart Minor Benjamin & Arti K. Rai, Administrative Power in the Era of Patent Stare 
Decisis, 65 DUKE L.J. 1563, 1564 (2016); Tran, supra note 2, at 837; Wasserman, supra note 2, at 
1977–2006; cf. Golden, supra note 2, at 1659 (arguing that Chevron deference is inappropriate 
because the AIA does not give the PTAB authority to act with force of law, but that nonbinding 
Skidmore deference may be appropriate). 
 13. See infra notes 61–67 and accompanying text. 
 14. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 448 (1987) (“In th[e] process of filling ‘any 
[statutory] gap left, implicitly or explicitly, by Congress,’ the courts must respect the 
interpretation of the agency to which Congress has delegated the responsibility for administering 
the statutory program.” (quoting Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 
837, 843 (1984))). 
 15. See, e.g., In re Gartside, 203 F.3d 1305, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 
 16. For example, whether prior art anticipates an invention under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) is a 
question of fact. Kennametal, Inc. v. Ingersoll Cutting Tool Co., 780 F.3d 1376, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 
2015). But whether prior art makes an invention obvious under 35 U.S.C. § 103 is a question of 
law based on underlying facts. SSL Servs., LLC v. Citrix Sys., Inc., 769 F.3d 1073, 1082 (Fed. Cir. 
2014). For an excellent review, see generally ROBERT PATRICK MERGES & JOHN FITZGERALD DUFFY, 
PATENT LAW AND POLICY: CASES AND MATERIALS ch. 10.A (7th ed. 2017). 
 17. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, TRIAL STATISTICS IPR, PGR, CBM: PATENT TRIAL AND 
APPEAL BOARD 3 (2018), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/trial_statistics 
_20180731.pdf.  
 18. 35 U.S.C. § 311(b) (2012). 
 19. See, e.g., Owens Corning v. Fast Felt Corp., 873 F.3d 896, 902–03 (Fed. Cir. 2017) 
(reversing a PTAB decision rejecting an obviousness challenge after concluding that claim 
interpretation was incorrect); Homeland Housewares, LLC v. Whirlpool Corp., 865 F.3d 1372, 
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involve rulings on three issues: novelty, nonobviousness, and claim 
interpretation. The Federal Circuit codes novelty as a question of fact, 
reviewing agency findings for substantial evidence.20 But it codes 
nonobviousness and claim interpretation as legal conclusions that it reviews 
de novo (although it reviews subsidiary factual findings for substantial 
evidence).21 This approach leaves considerable scope for appellate review of 
two of the three principal issues in IPRs. 
The AIA provides for Federal Circuit review of PTAB decisions,22 without 
specifying standards of review. The scope of review could determine the 
success of these proceedings as a quicker, cheaper, and more expert 
alternative to district court litigation for adjudicating challenges to patent 
validity.23 Liberal use of de novo review adds to the cost and duration of 
proceedings and prolongs uncertainty as to outcomes. The standards of 
review that the Federal Circuit applies to PTAB decisions in AIA proceedings 
today are generally preordained by its own prior characterizations of issues as 
factual or legal in the context of court/court review. Perhaps in the past, de 
novo review allowed the Federal Circuit to exercise greater quality control over 
generalist trial courts with limited competence to resolve patent matters.24 
The net benefits are more dubious as applied to decisions of expert PTAB 
panels in AIA adjudications. Yet, reversal rates at the Federal Circuit are 
essentially the same for PTAB decisions as for decisions of district courts in 
patent cases,25 threatening to frustrate a system “designed to establish a more 
efficient and streamlined patent system that will improve patent quality and 
limit unnecessary and counterproductive litigation costs.”26 
The Supreme Court has not yet addressed the proper scope of judicial 
review of appealable PTAB rulings.27 It has, however, provided guidance for 
 
1377–79 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (reversing the PTAB determination that challenged claims were not 
anticipated where the PTAB failed to interpret a disputed claim term). 
 20. See In re Morsa, 713 F.3d 104, 109 (Fed. Cir. 2013). 
 21. Merck & Cie v. Gnosis S.P.A., 808 F.3d 829, 833 (Fed. Cir. 2015); Microsoft Corp. v. 
Proxyconn, Inc., 789 F.3d 1292, 1297 (Fed. Cir. 2015), overruled on other grounds by Aqua Prods., 
Inc. v. Matal, 872 F.3d 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
 22. 35 U.S.C. §§ 141(c), 319. 
 23. Joe Matal, A Guide to the Legislative History of the America Invents Act: Part II of II, 21 FED. 
CIR. B.J. 539, 598–99 (2012); see infra notes 68–73 and accompanying text.  
 24. Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in Specialized Courts, 64 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 1, 46–52 (1989) (arguing that deferential review of fact finding in generalist district courts 
presented obstacles to achieving uniformity in the patent system through appellate review by 
specialized court); Rai, supra note 7, at 1040 (“The Federal Circuit’s exercise of de novo review over 
fact finding may be rationalized by the argument that, despite the court’s appellate status, it still has 
fact finding capabilities superior to those of the other decisionmakers in the patent system.”). 
 25. See infra notes 75–78 and accompanying text. 
 26. H.R. REP. NO. 112-98, pt. 1, at 40 (2011). 
 27. In Cuozzo Speed Technologies, LLC v. Lee, the Court held that PTAB decisions on whether 
to institute review are not reviewable on appeal and upheld a PTO rule that applies the broadest 
reasonable interpretation (“BRI”) to patent claims that are challenged in PTAB proceedings. 
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judicial review of lower court rulings (court-court review) on mixed questions 
of law and fact in other fields. The Court has embraced a nuanced, functional 
approach that focuses on the nature of the inquiry, the comparative 
advantages of the lower tribunal and the reviewing court in performing that 
function, and the specificity or generalizability of the ruling, without assigning 
talismanic significance to the labels “law” or “fact.” 
This Essay borrows this functional analysis to reconsider the proper scope 
of judicial review of PTAB decisions on two issues that the Federal Circuit 
codes as legal conclusions with factual underpinnings: nonobviousness and 
claim interpretation. Part II contrasts the Federal Circuit approach to review 
of mixed questions of law and fact in patent law with the functional approach 
of the Supreme Court to judicial review of lower court decisions on similar 
questions in other fields, exemplified by the 2018 decision in U.S. Bank 
National Ass’n v. Village at Lakeridge.28 Part III considers judicial review of PTAB 
rulings, looking to the APA and the AIA for guidance. Part IV applies a 
functional analysis to reconsider judicial review of mixed questions of law and 
fact that arise in PTAB proceedings, focusing on nonobviousness in Section 
IV.A and on claim interpretation in Section IV.B. Part V considers how 
functional considerations have shifted since the Federal Circuit was created, 
calling into question the continued wisdom of applying an approach laid 
down by an earlier generation of judges long before the creation of the PTAB. 
II. MIXED QUESTIONS OF LAW AND FACT 
The Federal Circuit’s approach to judicial review rests on a strict 
bifurcation of lower court rulings between legal conclusions and factual 
findings, with no room for an intermediate category of mixed questions of law 
and fact.29 This leads to puzzling discontinuities in standards of review for 
similar questions based on apparently arbitrary differences in how they are 
coded.  
An example is the difference in standards of review for rulings on 
“novelty” and “nonobviousness.” Legal standards for patentability require 
comparing inventions to previously available technology (“prior art”).30 If a 
prior art reference (such as a prior patent or publication) identically discloses 
 
Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2142 (2016) (relying on 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b) 
(2015), which at the time stated: “A claim in an unexpired patent shall be given its broadest 
reasonable construction in light of the specification of the patent in which it appears”). In SAS 
Institute, Inc. v. Iancu, the Court held invalid as inconsistent with statutory language a PTO rule 
that allowed the PTAB to institute review on only a subset of challenged claims. SAS Inst., Inc. v. 
Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1354 (2018).  
 28. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n ex rel. CWCapital Asset Mgmt. LLC v. Vill. at Lakeridge, LLC, 138 
S. Ct. 960 (2018). 
 29. For an extended treatment and analysis of this approach see Rai, supra note 7, at 1042–65. 
 30. 35 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103 (2012). Other legal rules and standards provide additional 
grounds for rejecting patent applications or for challenging the validity of issued patents but are 
beyond the scope of the discussion in text. 
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an invention, the invention is not patentable because it fails the legal standard 
of novelty.31 If there are differences between the invention and the prior art, 
but those differences would have been obvious at the time to a person having 
ordinary skill in the art, the invention is not patentable because it fails the 
legal standard of nonobviousness.32  
The Federal Circuit considers novelty determinations to be findings of 
fact reviewable for clear error if made by district courts33 and for substantial 
evidence if made by the PTO.34 But it considers nonobviousness 
determinations to be conclusions of law that rest on underlying factual 
findings.35 The Federal Circuit purports to review the underlying factual 
findings with deference, while reviewing the ultimate determinations de 
novo.36  
The Supreme Court offers another approach, exemplified by the recent 
decision in U.S. Bank National Ass’n v. Village at Lakeridge, LLC.37 That case 
considered whether a reviewing court should review de novo or for clear error 
a bankruptcy court ruling that a third party to whom a creditor transferred its 
interest in a claim against a debtor was not an “insider” of the debtor.38 The 
bankruptcy court ruled that the transferee—whose romantic partner was both 
a corporate officer of the debtor and a board member of its owner—was not 
an insider.39 The Ninth Circuit affirmed, reviewing the decision for clear error 
rather than de novo.40 The Supreme Court granted certiorari solely on the 
question of whether the Ninth Circuit applied the correct standard of 
review.41  
The Court’s analysis is not bankruptcy-specific, but draws on wide-
ranging cases considering judicial review of other mixed questions of law and 
fact arising in other fields.42 There is nothing groundbreaking about this 
decision, which follows a long line of cases attempting to identify 
 
 31. Id. § 102. 
 32. Id. § 103. 
 33. The clearly erroneous standard is required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a)(6), 
which provides: “Findings of fact, whether based on oral or other evidence, must not be set aside 
unless clearly erroneous, and the reviewing court must give due regard to the trial court’s 
opportunity to judge the witnesses’ credibility.” FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a)(6). 
 34. REG Synthetic Fuels, LLC v. Neste Oil Oyj, 841 F.3d 954, 958 (Fed. Cir. 2016). 
 35. See infra Section IV.A. 
 36. See infra Section IV.A. 
 37. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n ex rel. CWCapital Asset Mgmt. LLC v. Vill. at Lakeridge, LLC, 138 
S. Ct. 960, 967 (2018) (highlighting that the question at issue was a mixed question of law and fact). 
 38. Id. at 963. 
 39. Id. at 963–64. 
 40. In re The Vill. at Lakeridge, LLC, 814 F.3d 993, 1002 (9th Cir. 2016), cert. granted in part 
sub nom. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Vill. at Lakeridge, LLC, 137 S. Ct. 1372 (2017), aff’d sub nom. Vill. 
at Lakeridge, 138 S. Ct. at 969. 
 41. Vill. at Lakeridge, 137 S. Ct. at 1372. 
 42. In re The Vill. at Lakeridge, LLC, No. 11-51994-BTB, 2013 WL 1397447, at *8 (B.A.P. 
9th Cir. Apr. 5, 2013). 
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circumstances that call for deferential review of mixed questions of law and 
fact.43 The Court described the bankruptcy court’s decision as involving some 
“purely legal” aspects (i.e., the correct legal test for identification of insiders) 
subject to de novo review, and some “purely factual” aspects (i.e., “who did 
what, when or where, how or why”) reviewable for clear error.44 But, the Court 
required a more nuanced approach for reviewing the ultimate determination 
of “whether the historical facts found satisfy the legal test . . . the so-called 
‘mixed question’ of law and fact at the heart of this case.”45  
The appropriate standard of review for such mixed questions depends 
on “the nature of the mixed question . . . and which kind of court (bankruptcy 
or appellate) is better suited to resolve it.”46 The Court asked whether the 
question “involves developing auxiliary legal principles of use in other cases” 
or whether it “immerse[s] courts in case-specific factual issues—compelling 
them to marshal and weigh evidence, make credibility judgments, and 
otherwise address what we have . . . called ‘multifarious, fleeting, special, 
narrow facts that utterly resist generalization.’”47  
Under this functional analysis, greater appellate scrutiny is appropriate 
for decisions that announce legal principles likely to have broader 
implications for other matters, while greater deference is appropriate for case-
specific decisions that rely on weighing evidence and are too narrow to be 
generalizable in other cases. Conventional wisdom holds that appellate courts 
charged with maintaining uniformity and coherence in the law are better than 
trial courts at elaborating legal principles with broader implications, while 
trial courts that are immersed in the evidence and can assess witness credibility 
are better than appellate courts at making case-specific determinations that 
rest primarily on an evidentiary record.48  
Narrower appellate review of case-specific rulings may also limit the costs 
of appellate review when the offsetting benefits are limited. These costs 
include scarce appellate judicial resources as well as the burden on the parties 
of prolonged litigation and delays in reaching final judgment.49 Excessive 
immersion in case-specific details may distract appellate courts from broader 
issues of law development and dissipate their advantage over trial courts in 
taking in the big picture.50 Developing the law through generalizable rulings 
 
 43. See Nika Aldrich, Recent Supreme Court Cases May Require More Deference in Review of 
Obviousness Cases, 56 J. FRANKLIN PIERCE CTR. FOR INTELL. PROP. 1, 6–14 (2016) (reviewing cases 
considering mixed questions of law and fact). 
 44. Vill. at Lakeridge, 138 S. Ct. at 965–66. 
 45. Id. at 966. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. at 967 (quoting Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 561–62 (1988)). 
 48. For a thoughtful discussion, see Edward H. Cooper, Civil Rule 52(a): Rationing and 
Rationalizing the Resources of Appellate Review, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 645, 649–57 (1988). 
 49. Id. at 649–52. 
 50. Cf. Mucha v. King, 792 F.2d 602, 605–06 (7th Cir. 1986) (“[T]he main reason for 
appellate deference to the findings of fact made by the trial court is not the appellate court’s lack 
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may be a more valuable use of appellate attention than correcting case-
specific errors. Standards of review may shape appellate dockets by 
encouraging certain appeals and discouraging others. Litigants may be less 
likely to appeal case-specific rulings if they will be reviewed with deference, 
and more likely to appeal rulings that will be reviewed de novo. The optimal 
approach may change over time depending on a number of factors, including 
the importance of developing and clarifying the law and of correcting 
particularly costly errors, the need to achieve uniformity, predictability and 
reliability of decisions in the field, the competence of lower tribunals, and the 
capacity of appellate courts. 
III. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF PTAB DECISIONS (COURT-AGENCY REVIEW) 
The cases applying the functional analysis discussed in the previous 
Section primarily involve judicial review of decisions of courts rather than 
decisions of agencies. Although court-agency review has generally been more 
deferential than court-court review,51 the implications of this line of cases for 
Federal Circuit review of PTAB decisions in AIA adjudications are nonetheless 
unclear. This Section considers whether the APA, common law administrative 
law, or the Patent Act call for a different standard of review. 
The Supreme Court held in Dickinson v. Zurko that the APA governs 
judicial review of PTO factual findings, leading the Federal Circuit to shift 
from review for “clear error” to the more deferential “substantial evidence” 
standard.52 But by this point, the Federal Circuit had already minimized the 
significance of this shift through holdings that ultimate conclusions about 
claim interpretation and nonobviousness are legal conclusions subject to de 
novo review, even when they rest in part on subsidiary factual 
determinations.53  
 
of access to the materials for decision but that its main responsibility is to maintain the uniformity 
and coherence of the law, a responsibility not engaged if the only question is the legal significance 
of a particular and nonrecurring set of historical events.”). 
 51. See generally Bernard Schwartz, Mixed Questions of Law and Fact and the Administrative 
Procedure Act, 19 FORDHAM L. REV. 73 (1950) (describing the trend towards a narrower scope of 
judicial review of mixed questions in pre-APA cases and predicting continuation of that trend 
post-APA). 
 52. See Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 161–62 (1999); see also 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) 
(2012) (“[T]he reviewing court shall . . . hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and 
conclusions found to be . . . unsupported by substantial evidence in a case subject to sections 556 
and 557 of this title [concerning requirements for administrative hearings] or otherwise reviewed 
on the record of an agency hearing provided by statute . . . .”); In re Gartside, 203 F.3d 1305, 
1316 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“Although we have previously reviewed the Board’s factual 
determinations in an obviousness analysis for clear error, we now review them for substantial 
evidence.” (citations omitted)). 
 53. Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1456 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc) 
(regarding claim interpretation), abrogated on other grounds by Power Integrations, Inc. v. Fairchild 
Semiconductor Int’l, Inc., 904 F.3d 965 (Fed. Cir. 2018); Aktiebolaget Karlstads Mekaniska 
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The APA does not provide clear guidance as to the proper standard of 
review of legal conclusions by agencies. The statute arguably contemplates de 
novo review by providing that “the reviewing court shall decide all relevant 
questions of law” and that it shall “hold unlawful and set aside agency action, 
findings, and conclusions found to be—(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of 
discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law; . . . [or] (C) in excess of 
statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statutory right.”54 
But the actual practice of judicial review of agency decisions both before and 
after passage of the APA has generally been more deferential.55  
Under common law administrative law decisions, significant agency 
rulings interpreting the statutes they administer often receive either Chevron 
deference (on the theory that Congress has implicitly delegated to the agency 
authority to interpret ambiguous statutory provisions with the force of law) or 
Skidmore deference (if the court is persuaded by the thoroughness of the 
agency’s reasoning and moved by considerations of consistency in 
interpretation of the law over time).56 Either way, these decisions argue for 
greater deference than the Federal Circuit currently gives to PTAB rulings 
that work out the meaning of general statutory standards by applying them to 
the facts of particular cases.57 
The Patent Act provides for appeal of final written decisions of the PTAB 
to the Federal Circuit58 but does not specify the standard of review. On one 
view, failure to specify a different standard of review means that general APA 
provisions for judicial review of agency decisions govern Federal Circuit 
review of PTAB decisions.59 On another view, the failure of Congress to specify 
a new standard indicates that it did not intend to disturb prior Federal Circuit 
practices in reviewing other PTO decisions.60 On a third view, reflecting the 
preference of four out of twelve Federal Circuit judges, the changes brought 
 
Werkstad v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 705 F.2d 1565, 1575 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (“Obviousness is a 
legal conclusion based on factual determinations and not a factual determination itself.”). 
 54. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (emphasis added). 
 55. See MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 16, at 897–900; Schwartz, supra note 51, at 73–75.  
 56. MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 16, at 910–13. Some commentators have questioned 
whether these authorities are consistent with the language of the APA. See id. 
 57. See supra note 14 and accompanying text (discussing implications of INS v. Cardoza-
Fonseca for deference to PTAB rulings). 
 58. 35 U.S.C. § 141(c). 
 59. See 5 U.S.C. § 701(a) (“This chapter applies, according to the provisions thereof, except 
to the extent that–(1) statutes preclude judicial review; or (2) agency action is committed to 
agency discretion by law.”). The Supreme Court relied on this language in Dickinson. Dickinson 
v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 154 (1999). 
 60. Federal Circuit Judges O’Malley, Wallach, and Stoll evidently feel constrained to follow 
this view, although they believe less deference to PTAB factfinding would be more consistent with 
the goals of the AIA. See Merck & Cie v. Gnosis S.P.A., 820 F.3d 432, 433 (Fed. Cir. 2016) 
(O’Malley, J., concurring in denial for rehearing en banc). 
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about by the new AIA proceedings argue for less deference to PTAB rulings 
rather than more.61 
These judges make four arguments. First, Judge Newman argues that 
deferential review is inadequate to achieve the legislative goal of correcting 
PTO mistakes.62 Second, inasmuch as the new proceedings are designed to 
substitute for district court proceedings, Judge O’Malley argues that PTAB 
findings should be reviewed under the same clear error standard used in 
reviewing non-jury findings of district courts.63 Third, because the statute sets 
the standard of proof before the PTAB as preponderance of the evidence,64 
rather than the higher clear and convincing evidence standard that patent 
challengers face in district court litigation,65 Judge Newman argues that closer 
appellate scrutiny is necessary to ensure accuracy of PTAB rulings.66 Fourth, 
Judge Newman argues that less deferential review is appropriate because 
Federal Circuit review is the only opportunity to correct errors in these 
proceedings, unlike other PTO decisions that are also subject to review by the 
Director or in de novo proceedings in the district courts.67  
Each of these arguments rests on the dubious premise that greater 
appellate scrutiny should counteract the effects of AIA design features that 
facilitate patent challenges before the PTAB. Congress chose to address the 
concern that examiners were issuing too many invalid patents by creating new 
administrative tribunals as an alternative to generalist trial courts for 
adjudicating patent challenges. This choice to depart from the model of 
district court litigation cautions against reflexive replication of its features. 
The lower statutory burden of proof for establishing invalidity before the 
PTAB68 may indicate that Congress has greater confidence in PTAB panels, 
staffed by “persons of competent legal knowledge and scientific ability,”69 than 
it has in district courts to reach correct decisions. Indeed, the Federal Circuit 
has justified the higher clear and convincing evidence burden in district 
courts as a form of deference to the expertise of the PTO, which issued the 
patent.70 It seems a dubious interpretive move to use heightened appellate 
 
 61. Merck & Cie v. Gnosis S.P.A., 808 F.3d 829, 839 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (Newman, J., 
dissenting), reh’g en banc denied, 820 F.3d 432, 433 (2016) (O’Malley, J., concurring). 
 62. Id. at 840–41.  
 63. Gnosis S.P.A., 820 F.3d at 434–35 (per curiam) (O’Malley, J., concurring). 
 64. 35 U.S.C. §§ 316(e), 326(e). 
 65. Par Pharm., Inc. v. TWi Pharm., Inc., 773 F.3d 1186, 1193 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
 66. Gnosis S.P.A., 808 F.3d at 841 (Newman, J., dissenting). 
 67. Id. at 840–42. 
 68. 35 U.S.C. §§ 316(e), 326(e) (providing that in IPR and PGR proceedings “the 
petitioner shall have the burden of proving a proposition of unpatentability by a preponderance 
of the evidence”). 
 69. Id. § 6(a). 
 70. Pfizer, Inc. v. Apotex, Inc., 480 F.3d 1348, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (“[D]eference to the 
decisions of the USPTO takes the form of the presumption of validity . . . . Since we must presume 
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scrutiny to cancel the effects of the Congressional choice to set a lower burden 
before the PTAB. Once these features are recognized as deliberate choices 
rather than inadvertent bugs, it is at least as plausible that Congress intended 
to bring about more deference to PTAB rulings rather than less. 
Moreover, by making PTAB decisions on whether to institute an IPR or 
PGR proceeding “final and nonappealable,”71 Congress showed willingness to 
constrain judicial review in favor of quick and efficient resolution by the 
PTAB.72 Limiting opportunities for judicial review accelerates the resolution 
of patent challenges, a legislative goal that is manifest in the tight deadlines 
for each step in PTAB proceedings.73  
The statute also provides for appeal of PTAB decisions to the Federal 
Circuit.74 Even though appellate review inevitably adds costs and delays that 
interfere with expeditious resolution of disputes, Congress plainly 
contemplated a role for judicial review. But the scope of Federal Circuit review 
of PTAB rulings could determine the success of these new proceedings in 
achieving legislative goals.  
IV. FEDERAL CIRCUIT REVIEW OF NONOBVIOUSNESS AND CLAIM 
INTERPRETATION 
The Federal Circuit’s characterization of mixed questions of law and fact 
as legal conclusions has the effect of calling for de novo review of case-specific 
rulings for which the Federal Circuit has no clear functional advantage over 
expert PTAB panels. De novo review of these decisions threatens to undermine 
the system that Congress has chosen to improve quality control in the patent 
system through expeditious adjudication before expert administrative 
tribunals. 
It is important not to confuse the words courts use to define standards of 
review with the actual deference they give to decisions of lower tribunals. A 
court purporting to apply de novo review may routinely affirm rulings, while a 
court purporting to review for substantial evidence may review skeptically and 
reverse frequently. To tell the difference, one must examine what reviewing 
courts actually do, not merely what they say in rote language set forth in 
opinions.  
Arguably, the Federal Circuit has been more deferential toward PTAB 
rulings in its actual decisions than in its articulations of standards of review. 
 
a patent valid, the patent challenger bears the burden of proving the factual elements of invalidity 
by clear and convincing evidence.”). 
 71. 35 U.S.C. §§ 314(d), 324(e). 
 72. See Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2140 (2016) (rejecting 
interpretation of statute to preclude only interlocutory appeals from institution determinations, 
while allowing eventual judicial review of such determinations on appeal from final decision). 
 73. E.g., 35 U.S.C. §§ 313 (“Preliminary response to petition”), 314(b) (“Institution of inter 
partes review”), 316 (“Conduct of inter partes review”). 
 74. Id. § 319. 
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The Federal Circuit has affirmed roughly three out of four PTAB decisions, 
although the rate of affirmance appears to be declining.75 On the other hand, 
according to one recent statistical analysis of 2017 decisions, the Federal 
Circuit’s rate of affirmance for PTAB rulings (76%) was almost the same as its 
rate of affirmance for district court decisions (74%),76 suggesting only 
marginally greater deference to the PTAB than to district courts in actual 
outcomes.77 This is particularly surprising given selection bias in the cases 
considered by the PTAB, which has nonreviewable discretion to decline to 
institute review and may only institute review if it determines “that there is a 
reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 
one of the claims challenged.”78 Parity in reversal rates for the PTAB and 
district courts is consistent with a formal approach to standards of review that 
rests on a strict bifurcation between law and fact regardless of the tribunal. 
After initial ambiguity, the Federal Circuit and the Supreme Court now 
characterize both nonobviousness and claim interpretation as legal 
conclusions with evidentiary underpinnings. Both courts agree that 
underlying factual determinations should be reviewed with deference, while 
the ultimate conclusions should be reviewed de novo. Despite this formal 
similarity, in recent practice, Federal Circuit review of nonobviousness 
conclusions has become more deferential, with affirmance often following 
from a conclusion that evidence in the record supports implied underlying 
factual findings. At the same time, review of claim interpretation has become 
less deferential, with lower court interpretations often reversed on appeal 
notwithstanding support in the evidentiary record. The divergence reflects 
differences in the practices that the courts have approved to guide trial courts 
in making these determinations.  
 
 75. See Michael Joffre et al., PTAB at 5: Part 3—Fed. Circ. Statistics, LAW360 (Sept. 13, 2017, 
1:44 PM), https://www.sternekessler.com/sites/default/files/2018-01/PTAB_At_5_Part_3_% 
E2%80%94_Fed._Circ._Statistics.pdf (“While affirmances have always been the predominant 
outcome, the affirmance rate has drifted down in the past two years.”). 
 76. See Dan Bagatell, Fed. Circ.’s 2017 Patent Decisions: A Statistical Analysis, LAW360 (Jan. 5, 
2018, 2:41 PM), http://www.perkinscoie.com/images/content/1/8/v4/184121/Fed.-Circ.-s-
2017-Patent-Decisions-A-Statistical-Analysys.pdf. 
 77. Other studies have reached somewhat different results. One unpublished study—after 
excluding claim interpretation rulings, remands to the PTAB for insufficient explanation, and 
jury decisions from District Courts—concluded that the Federal Circuit affirms PTAB rulings on 
validity at a higher rate (91.1%) than it affirms similar rulings from District Courts (84.7%). 
Matthew G. Sipe, Experts, Generalists, Laypeople—and the Federal Circuit 46 (Aug. 1, 2018) 
(unpublished manuscript), available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract 
_id=3228585. But that disparity is driven almost entirely by differences in rates of affirmance of 
fact finding, with legal conclusions affirmed at approximately the same rates for both tribunals. Id.  
 78. 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), (d). For PGR, the standard for instituting review requires a finding 
“that it is more likely than not that at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition is 
unpatentable.” Id. § 324(a). 
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A. NONOBVIOUSNESS 
As the courts have elaborated the nonobviousness determination over 
the years, it has become highly case-specific, consisting primarily of 
consideration and weighing of evidence. Most of the cases involve court-court 
review, but cases involving court-agency review are remarkably similar. 
The requirement of nonobviousness, now codified in section 103 of the 
Patent Act, began as a common law requirement for “invention” that courts 
treated as a question of fact.79 The modern approach to the law/fact 
distinction for the codified standard of nonobviousness emerged from the 
following passage in the 1966 decision of the Supreme Court in Graham v. 
John Deere:  
While the ultimate question of patent validity is one of law, the § 103 
condition, which is but one of three conditions, each of which must 
be satisfied, lends itself to several basic factual inquiries. Under  
§ 103, the scope and content of the prior art are to be determined; 
differences between the prior art and the claims at issue are to be 
ascertained; and the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art 
resolved. Against this background, the obviousness or 
nonobviousness of the subject matter is determined. Such secondary 
considerations as commercial success, long felt but unsolved needs, 
failure of others, etc., might be utilized to give light to the 
circumstances surrounding the origin of the subject matter sought 
to be patented.80  
It is unclear what the Court meant by “the ultimate question of patent 
validity is one of law.” The cases do not hold that every “condition” of patent 
validity presents a question of law. The Federal Circuit codes at least one such 
condition––novelty under section 102––as a question of fact.81 What is clear 
is that the Court saw nonobviousness as involving “several basic factual 
inquiries.”82 
 The Supreme Court later took note of the ambiguity in Dennison v. 
Panduit and sought “the Federal Circuit’s informed opinion on the complex 
issue of the degree to which the obviousness determination is one of fact.”83 
 
 79. Keyes v. Grant, 118 U.S. 25, 37 (1886) (reversing directed verdict where both sides 
introduced expert testimony because “this was a question of fact, properly to be left for 
determination to the jury”). 
 80. Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kan. City, 383 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1966) (citation omitted). 
 81. Brown v. 3M, 265 F.3d 1349, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2001). Other validity requirements that 
have been coded as factual include utility under section 101, see Newman v. Quigg, 877 F.2d 1575, 
1581 (Fed. Cir. 1989); the written description requirement under section 112, see Enzo Biochem, 
Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc., 285 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2002); and the best mode requirement 
under section 112 (although no longer a ground of invalidity). See Northern Telecom Ltd. v. 
Samsung Elecs. Co., 215 F.3d 1281, 1286 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 
 82. Graham, 383 U.S. at 17. 
 83. Dennison Mfg. Co. v. Panduit Corp., 475 U.S. 809, 811 (1986). 
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Elaborating on remand, the Federal Circuit explained that after determining 
the factual issues identified in Graham v. John Deere: 
[T]he decisionmaker confronts a ghost, i.e., “a person having 
ordinary skill in the art,” not unlike the “reasonable man” and other 
ghosts in the law. . . . In light of all the evidence, the decisionmaker 
must then determine whether the patent challenger has 
convincingly established that the claimed invention as a whole would 
have been obvious at that time to that person. The answer to that 
question partakes more of the nature of law than of fact, for it is an 
ultimate conclusion based on a foundation formed of all the 
probative facts.84 
It is not clear why a conclusion “formed of all the probative facts” is more 
legal than factual.85 The court seems to recognize the mixed character of the 
conclusion by stating that it “partakes more of the nature of law than of fact” 
and in the analogy to the “reasonable man.”86 The court justified its coding of 
the ultimate conclusion as legal as “[facilitating] a consistent application of 
that statute in the courts and in the [PTO],”87 presumably by setting the stage 
for de novo review. 
In its 2007 decision in KSR v. Teleflex,88 the Supreme Court clearly 
accepted the Federal Circuit’s framing of nonobviousness as “a legal 
conclusion based on factual determinations and not a factual determination 
itself.”89 Yet notwithstanding this coding, nonobviousness is a highly case-
specific determination that requires immersion in an evidentiary record.90 
In both Graham and KSR, the Supreme Court stressed the case-specific 
nature of the ultimate conclusion of obviousness. In Graham, the Court said 
that “[w]hat is obvious is not a question upon which there is likely to be 
uniformity of thought in every given factual context” but that it “should be 
amenable to a case-by-case development.”91 In KSR the Court rejected the 
Federal Circuit’s efforts to formalize the nonobviousness inquiry through 
 
 84. Panduit Corp. v. Dennison Mfg. Co., 810 F.2d 1561, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (on remand) 
(citations omitted). 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. at 1567. 
 88. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 427 (2007). 
 89. Aktiebolaget Karlstads Mekaniska Werkstad v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 705 F.2d 1565, 
1575 (Fed. Cir. 1983); see also Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 839 F.3d 1034, 1047 (Fed. Cir. 
2016) (en banc) (“Obviousness is a question of law based on underlying facts.”); Kinetic Concepts, 
Inc. v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 688 F.3d 1342, 1356–57 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (finding the same).  
 90. See Ted L. Field, Obviousness as Fact: The Issue of Obviousness in Patent Law Should Be a 
Question of Fact Reviewed with Appropriate Deference, 27 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 
555, 590 (2017) (arguing that courts should decide obviousness as a question of fact and not as 
a question of law). 
 91. Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kan. City, 383 U.S. 1, 18 (1966). 
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“rigid and mandatory formulas . . . that deny factfinders recourse to common 
sense.”92 In both cases the analysis focuses on case-specific and evidentiary 
aspects of the determination. 
In the years since KSR, the Federal Circuit has continued to recite that it 
reviews the underlying factual determinations of district courts for clear error 
(or for “substantial evidence” in jury cases) and the ultimate conclusion de 
novo. But this purported de novo review has become increasingly perfunctory, 
at least when the court finds sufficient evidence in the record to support the 
subsidiary findings. It is the evidentiary record behind these findings, not 
legal analysis of the conclusion, that dominates the decisions. 
Increasing deference to lower courts may in part reflect expansion in the 
number and significance of factual determinations underlying 
nonobviousness. In addition to the statutory “factual inquiries” recited in 
Graham, the Federal Circuit elevated what the Supreme Court characterized 
as “secondary considerations [such] as commercial success, long felt but 
unsolved needs, failure of others, etc.”93 to the status of a fourth factor of 
“objective evidence” that must be considered when offered.94 The Federal 
Circuit treats findings on objective evidence as factual.95 The Federal Circuit 
further expanded the evidentiary underpinnings of nonobviousness analysis 
in cases requiring a “teaching, suggestion, or motivation” to combine 
references (“TSM”) when a challenge for obviousness rests on more than one 
source of prior art.96 Other factual underpinnings of nonobviousness include 
whether there was a reasonable expectation of success97 and whether an 
invention produces unexpected results.98 Litigants introduce evidence on 
these factual underpinnings, generating a record that supports factual 
findings and makes them difficult to reverse. 
For cases tried to juries, appellate deference is even greater. First, factual 
findings of juries are reviewed under the more deferential “substantial 
evidence” standard99 rather than the clear error standard applied to findings 
 
 92. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. at 419, 421. 
 93. Graham, 383 U.S. at 17–18. 
 94. Apple Inc., 839 F.3d at 1048 (“Objective indicia of nonobviousness must be considered 
in every case where present.”).  
 95. See Circuit Check Inc. v. QXQ Inc., 795 F.3d 1331, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 
 96. E.g., Alza Corp. v. Mylan Labs., Inc., 464 F.3d 1286, 1289–90 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“The 
presence or absence of a motivation to combine references in an obviousness determination is a 
pure question of fact.” (quoting In re Gartside, 203 F.3d 1305, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2000))). 
 97. E.g., Par Pharm., Inc. v. TWi Pharm., Inc., 773 F.3d 1186, 1196 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“The 
presence or absence of a reasonable expectation of success is also a question of fact.”). 
 98. E.g., Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 752 F.3d 967, 976–78 (Fed. 
Cir. 2014), reh’g and reh’g en banc denied, 769 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (reviewing with deference 
findings on unexpected results). 
 99. Apple Inc., 839 F.3d at 1040. The substantial evidence standard also applies to jury 
findings in other fields of law. Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938). 
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of trial court judges.100 Second, although trial court judges typically enter 
written findings of fact and conclusions of law that provide a detailed account 
of the basis for their decisions, jury verdicts are less precise. Explicit reasoning 
is more amenable to appellate review101 than unexplained conclusions. The 
Federal Circuit does not require that juries specify the subsidiary facts that 
they find but allows trial courts to submit the ultimate determination on 
obviousness to juries.102 When a jury returns even a purely advisory verdict on 
the ultimate determination of obviousness, the Federal Circuit “first 
presume[s] that the jury resolved the underlying factual disputes in favor of 
the verdict [] and leave[s] those presumed findings undisturbed if they are 
supported by substantial evidence” before examining the ultimate legal 
conclusion “de novo to see whether it is correct in light of the presumed jury 
fact findings.”103 Although, in theory, the Federal Circuit might reweigh these 
implicit factual findings to reach a different conclusion on de novo review, 
having identified presumed findings that are consistent with the jury’s 
conclusion, the Federal Circuit may be more likely to agree with it. 
A deferential approach to lower court rulings on nonobviousness makes 
sense under a functional approach. A legal conclusion that rests on weighing 
explicit or implicit factual findings necessarily immerses courts in marshalling 
and weighing evidence and making credibility judgments. Appellate review of 
nonobviousness rulings requires exhaustive consideration of the record. The 
resulting conclusions are deeply entwined in analysis of the case-specific 
evidentiary record and are unlikely to have generalizable implications for 
other cases. 
Similar considerations also call for deference to PTAB rulings on 
nonobviousness. The Federal Circuit articulates similar standards of review 
for PTAB decisions on obviousness, stating that it reviews underlying factual 
determinations for substantial evidence and the ultimate conclusion de 
novo.104  
 
 100. FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a)(6) (“Findings of fact, whether based on oral or other evidence, 
must not be set aside unless clearly erroneous . . . .”). 
 101. The Supreme Court, in KSR, stated that “[t]o facilitate review, this analysis should be 
made explicit.” KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007). 
 102. For an early example, see Connell v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 722 F.2d 1542, 1547 (Fed. Cir. 
1983) (“[I]t is not error to submit the question of obviousness to the jury. . . . [T]he role of the 
jury in determining obviousness is not unlike its role in reaching a legal conclusion respecting 
negligence. . . .”). See also McGinley v. Franklin Sports, Inc., 262 F.3d 1358, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2001) 
(Michel, J., dissenting) (“The difficulty presented in this appeal is how to separate the role of the 
jury to find facts . . . from the role of trial judges in reaching, or for us freely reviewing, the 
ultimate legal conclusion of obviousness, vel non. . . . with no identification of the jury’s resolution 
of genuine disputes over material factual issues.”). 
 103. Kinetic Concepts, Inc. v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 688 F.3d 1342, 1356–57 (Fed. Cir. 
2012) (second alteration in original) (emphasis added) (quoting Jurgens v. McKasy, 927 F.2d 
1552, 1557 (Fed. Cir. 1991)). 
 104. Arendi S.A.R.L. v. Apple Inc., 832 F.3d 1355, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citing In re 
Gartside, 203 F.3d 1305, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2000)). 
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But the PTAB, unlike juries, has to explain the evidentiary basis for its 
findings and the reasoning behind its conclusions,105 making reversal much 
easier. If the PTAB fails to explain its decision, the Federal Circuit does not 
search the record for substantial evidence to support implicit findings. 
Instead, it will vacate and remand the case with instructions to make the 
necessary findings and to explain its reasoning more fully.106  
The contrast between the Federal Circuit’s willingness to infer whatever 
subsidiary fact findings would support jury decisions, and its insistence that 
the PTAB explain the basis for its rulings, may look like less deferential review 
of PTAB rulings than of jury rulings on the same issue. Yet functional analysis 
seems to cut the other way. The greater expertise and experience of the PTAB 
make it well suited to the job of applying legal standards for nonobviousness 
to evidentiary records. The technological complexity of nonobviousness 
determinations may pose a challenge for juries and even for generalist trial 
courts, but these determinations are within the PTAB’s wheelhouse. The AIA 
goal of accelerating resolution of patent challenges is an additional functional 
reason for deferential review of PTAB rulings. 
But perhaps lack of deference is the wrong way to characterize Federal 
Circuit determinations that PTAB decisions lack adequate explanation. At 
least formally, the basis for remanding or reversing in these cases is not 
disagreement with the PTAB’s conclusions, but rather failure of the PTAB to 
observe procedural requirements that apply to the PTO but not to juries. The 
Patent Act and the APA require the PTAB to explain the basis for its decisions 
in writing.107 A written explanation allows the Federal Circuit to review 
whether the PTAB has complied with these and other procedural 
requirements.108 When the Federal Circuit remands to the PTAB, it may be 
 
 105. Id. at 1363 (allowing the PTAB to invoke “common sense” in support of an obviousness 
determination but noting “it must still be supported by evidence and a reasoned explanation”); 
see also DSS Tech. Mgmt. v. Apple Inc., 885 F.3d 1367, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
 106. In re Nuvasive, Inc., 842 F.3d 1376, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Ariosa Diagnostics v. Verinata 
Health, Inc., 805 F.3d 1359, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2015).  
 107. 35 U.S.C. §§ 318(a), 328(a) (2012) (requiring “a final written decision with respect to 
the patentability of any patent claim challenged by the petitioner and any new claim added [by 
amendment]”); 5 U.S.C. § 555(e) (requiring “a brief statement of the grounds for denial” of a 
petition or request unless “the denial is self-explanatory”). The APA imposes additional 
requirements for formal adjudications, a category that the Federal Circuit has held includes IPRs. 
See id. §§ 554, 557(c)(3)(A) (requiring “a statement of . . . findings and conclusions, and the 
reasons or basis therefore, on all the material issues of fact, law, or discretion presented on the 
record”); EmeraChem Holdings, LLC v. Volkswagen Grp. of Am., Inc., 859 F.3d 1341, 1348 (Fed. 
Cir. 2017). 
 108. See EmeraChem Holdings, 859 F.3d at 1345 (“We review the Board’s procedures for 
compliance with the [APA] de novo, under which we must ‘hold unlawful and set aside agency 
action . . . not in accordance with the law [or] . . . without observance of procedure required by 
law.’” (alterations in original) (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 706)). 
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enforcing these procedural requirements rather than withholding deference 
from substantive determinations.109 
It is possible, however, that the Federal Circuit is using remands for 
inadequate explanation rather than reversing for legal error when it disagrees 
with the PTAB’s rulings. When the Federal Circuit remands for further 
explanation rather than using de novo review to clarify the legal errors of the 
PTAB, it implicitly recognizes that the PTAB is in a better position than the 
Federal Circuit panel to apply the law to the facts of the case.110 But remands 
delay quick resolution without the offsetting benefit of providing 
generalizable guidance from the appellate court as to the applicable law. 
Indeed, when the Federal Circuit remands for further explanation, it often 
uses nonprecedential opinions, a designation indicating that the opinion 
does not significantly add to the body of law and should not provide binding 
precedent for future courts.111  
Functional analysis favors deferential review of PTAB determinations on 
nonobviousness given the case-specificity of these rulings, the expertise of the 
PTAB, and the importance of prompt adjudication of patent challenges 
under the AIA. Recent Federal Circuit decisions suggest a possible trend 
towards remand of more nonobviousness challenges to the PTAB for 
insufficient explanation.112 Although it is surely important for administrative 
tribunals to explain the basis for their decisions, remands should be used 
sparingly to preserve the value of these proceedings as an expeditious 
alternative to litigation. 
B. CLAIM INTERPRETATION 
The black letter standard of review for claim interpretation sounds 
remarkably similar to that for nonobviousness: It is a legal conclusion that the 
Federal Circuit reviews de novo, although it may rest on factual determinations 
 
 109. See, e.g., Ariosa Diagnostics, 805 F.3d at 1367 (remanding for clarification of whether 
Board’s rejection of petitioner’s reliance on a particular piece of evidence rested on a legally 
permissible ground or on an improper ground). 
 110. E.g., PPC Broadband, Inc. v. Iancu, 739 F. App’x 615, 628 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (issuing a 
second remand to the PTAB for failure to give adequate weight to objective evidence of 
nonobviousness after reaching same conclusion on first remand); Arista Networks, Inc. v. Cisco 
Sys., Inc., 726 F. App’x 787, 791 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (remanding for failure to explain finding that 
reference fails to disclose claim limitation). On the other hand, some opinions have sought to 
discern a basis for affirming PTAB decisions, “even if that path is less than perfectly clear.” Cablz, 
Inc. v. Chums, Inc., 708 F. App’x 1006, 1012 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (nonprecedential opinion). 
 111. FED. CIR. R. 32.1(b), (d); see e.g., Google Inc. v. Intellectual Ventures II LLC, 701 F. 
App’x 946, 948–49 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (nonprecedential opinion). 
 112. See, e.g., Personal Web Techs., LLC v. Apple, Inc., 848 F.3d 987, 994 (Fed. Cir. 2017); 
In re Nuvasive, Inc., 842 F.3d 1376, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Ariosa Diagnostics, 805 F.3d at 1368; 
cf. DSS Tech. Mgmt., Inc. v. Apple, Inc., 885 F.3d 1367, 1385 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (reversing 
obviousness determination without remand where record did not contain sufficient explanation 
for decision). 
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reviewed for clear error.113 Despite this formal similarity, Federal Circuit 
review has been notably less deferential for claim interpretation than for 
nonobviousness.  
Challenges to PTAB rulings on claim interpretation have a higher 
likelihood of success at the Federal Circuit than any other grounds for appeal, 
accounting for close to a third of reversals and remands in one recent tally.114 
This is unsurprising, because claim interpretation lurks behind most validity 
disputes, with errors in claim interpretation requiring reversal of validity 
rulings on appeal.  
Current claim interpretation practices are of quite recent origin. In the 
past, patent infringement actions were generally tried before courts rather 
than juries, with courts interpreting claims as necessary to address validity and 
infringement.115 This pattern changed in the 1970s as patent owners 
increasingly sought jury trials in infringement actions.116 Trial courts would 
instruct juries on claim interpretation along with instructions on related 
disputes about validity and infringement.117 
Claim interpretation by juries ended abruptly with the decision in 
Markman v. Westview.118 A majority of the Federal Circuit held en banc that 
claim interpretation is a matter of law for the court,119 with three judges 
writing separately to recognize that claim interpretation involves at least some 
factual aspects.120 The Supreme Court agreed it was proper for the trial court 
to interpret the claim language without deference to the jury, but avoided a 
crisp bifurcation between law and fact, recognizing that construing claim 
language was a “mongrel practice.”121 The Court emphasized functional 
considerations to conclude that claim interpretation was better suited for 
judges than juries, noting that judges have legal training and skills in exegesis 
and that assigning the task to judges promotes uniformity in interpretation.122 
 
 113. Microsoft Corp. v. Proxyconn, Inc., 789 F.3d 1292, 1297 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (citing Teva 
Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831, 841–42 (2015)), overruled on other grounds by 
Aqua Prods., Inc. v. Matal, 872 F.3d 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
 114. Rachel L. Emsley et al., Lessons Learned from Appeals of PTAB Decisions, FINNEGAN 
(Mar./Apr. 2017), https://www.finnegan.com/en/insights/lessons-learned-from-appeals-of-
ptab-decisions.html.  
 115. See J. Jonas Anderson & Peter S. Menell, Informal Deference: A Historical, Empirical, and 
Normative Analysis of Patent Claim Construction, 108 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 13–18 (2013). 
 116. Id. at 18–20. 
 117. Id. at 21 (citing Paul R. Michel, The Challenge Ahead: Increasing Predictability in Federal 
Circuit Jurisprudence for the New Century, 43 AM. U. L. REV. 1231, 1238 (1994)). 
 118. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 388–89 (1996). 
 119. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 988 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc). 
 120. Id. at 989 (Mayer, J., concurring); id. at 998 (Rader, J., concurring); id. at 999 (Newman, 
J., dissenting).  
 121. Markman, 517 U.S. at 378–84.  
 122. Id. at 388–90. 
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This decision led to a revolution of claim interpretation practices in 
litigation.123  
The Supreme Court opinion in Markman did not address the standard of 
appellate review for claim interpretation decisions. The Federal Circuit 
maintained its position in Markman that claim interpretations were legal 
conclusions subject to de novo review,124 although a minority of Federal Circuit 
judges continued to argue for greater deference to trial court factual 
determinations that underlie claim interpretation.125  
The Supreme Court ultimately required greater deference to lower court 
factfinding in Teva Pharmaceuticals v. Sandoz,126 holding that the Court of 
Appeals should review for “clear error” the trial court’s resolution of 
underlying factual disputes.127 But the Court’s simultaneous approval of two 
other Federal Circuit positions—that the ultimate issue of claim 
interpretation is a legal conclusion subject to de novo review and that clear 
error review applies only to findings based on “extrinsic evidence” such as 
expert testimony128—limited the impact of this ruling. The Teva decision thus 
represents a shift towards the Federal Circuit’s formalist sorting of the 
“mongrel practice” of claim interpretation into distinct categories of factual 
underpinnings and legal conclusions.129  
Coding claim interpretations based on “intrinsic evidence” (i.e., review 
of the patent and its prosecution history) as purely legal analysis without 
factual underpinnings is of recent and uncertain provenance. It contradicts 
the Federal Circuit’s own practice in its first decade, when it repeatedly 
 
 123. See PETER S. MENELL ET AL., PATENT CASE MANAGEMENT JUDICIAL GUIDE § 5 (3d ed. 2016). 
 124. See Lighting Ballast Control LLC v. Philips Elecs. N. Am. Corp., 744 F.3d 1272, 1292 
(Fed. Cir. 2014) (en banc), cert. granted, judgment vacated sub nom. Lighting Ballast Control LLC 
v. Universal Lighting Techs., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1173 (2015), remanded, 790 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 
2015); Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1456 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc).  
 125. E.g., Cybor Corp., 138 F.3d at 1462 (Plager, J., concurring) (“Though we review [the trial 
court] record ‘de novo,’ . . . common sense dictates that the trial judge’s view will carry weight.”); 
id. at 1463 (Bryson, J., concurring) (“[T]hat claim construction is an issue of law does not mean 
that . . . we will give no weight to a district court’s conclusion . . . .”); id. at 1463–64 (Mayer, C.J., 
concurring) (“[T]he Court [in Markman v. Westview] chose not to accept our formulation of claim 
construction[] as a pure question of law to be decided de novo in all cases on appeal. . . .”); id. at 
1473–74 (Rader, J., dissenting in part, concurring in part, and joining in part) (describing that 
de novo review postpones certainty about claim interpretation until the end of litigation and thus 
aggravates the uncertainty that the Supreme Court sought to avoid in Markman). When the 
Federal Circuit finally revisited its use of de novo review en banc, a majority voted to affirm. Lighting 
Ballast Control, 744 F.3d at 1283. But some members of the court dissented vigorously. Id. at 1296 
(O’Malley, J., joined by Rader, C.J., Reyna, J., & Wallach, J., dissenting).  
 126. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831, 835 (2015). 
 127. Id. at 840–41 (resolving disputes about the meaning of a claim term to practitioners in 
the relevant art in light of extrinsic evidence may present an underlying factual issue).  
 128. Teva Pharm., 135 S. Ct. at 841. 
 129. Scholars have questioned the coherence of efforts to sort rulings into distinct categories 
of law and fact. E.g., Cooper, supra note 48, at 659–60; Rai, supra note 7, at 1042–44; Schwartz, 
supra note 51, at 73–75.  
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recognized that interpretation of prosecution history in the course of claim 
interpretation may present disputed factual questions.130 This prior approach 
is consistent with the longstanding practice of treating the content and 
meaning of patent specifications as presenting factual questions when they 
are considered as prior art.131 The Federal Circuit treats the question of 
whether a prior art patent discloses a claimed invention (and thus defeats its 
novelty) as factual.132  
The specification and prosecution history of a patent may be more 
reliable evidence of the meaning of claim language than the sources that 
count as extrinsic evidence (such as expert testimony), but that does not 
change its evidentiary character. Moreover, if reliability is the basis for the 
distinction, it seems perverse to give less deference to interpretations based 
on more reliable intrinsic evidence, and more deference to findings based on 
less reliable extrinsic evidence. That intrinsic evidence, consisting entirely of 
documents, is equally available to appellate and trial courts does not justify a 
departure from clear error review under the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure.133  
Post-Teva, the Federal Circuit uses a variety of moves to avoid formal 
deference to any aspect of claim interpretation.134 When the record includes 
extrinsic evidence, the Federal Circuit sometimes concludes that the trial 
court made no findings of fact based on that evidence that require deferential 
review.135 The Supreme Court arguably approved this approach in Teva by 
 
 130. See, e.g., Arachnid, Inc. v. Medalist Mktg. Corp., 972 F.2d 1300, 1302 (Fed. Cir. 1992) 
(“[C]laim interpretation may require the factfinder to resolve certain factual issues such as what 
occurred during the prosecution history.”); Lemelson v. Gen. Mills, Inc., 968 F.2d 1202, 1206 (Fed. 
Cir. 1992) (“[T]he determination of the scope of the claim—its interpretation and proper 
construction—while denominated a question of law is in many cases based on the facts regarding the 
patent’s history. . . . [U]nderlying factual issues in dispute become the jury’s province to resolve.”); 
SmithKline Diagnostics, Inc. v. Helena Labs. Corp., 859 F.2d 878, 885 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (concluding 
that the lower court’s fact finding on disputed prosecution history was “clearly erroneous”). 
 131. See Dennison Mfg. Co. v. Panduit Corp., 475 U.S. 809, 810–11 (1986) (per curiam). 
 132. See Brown v. 3M, 265 F.3d 1349, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2001); see also, e.g., Panduit Corp. v. 
Dennison Mfg. Co., 810 F.2d 1561, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (including among factual components 
of nonobviousness analysis “what a prior art patent as a whole discloses”). 
 133. FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a)(6) (“Findings of fact, whether based on oral or other evidence, 
must not be set aside unless clearly erroneous . . . .”). 
 134. Cf. Anderson & Menell, supra note 115, at 76 (arguing based on review of decisions 
from 2000 through 2011 that after its 2005 decision in Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 
(Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc), although the Federal Circuit continued to adhere to de novo standard 
of review, actual reversal rates declined significantly). Because the study period ended in 2011, it 
did not permit observation of the effects of either the 2015 Supreme Court decision in Teva 
Pharmaceuticals v. Sandoz or the introduction of new AIA PTAB adjudications. 
 135. E.g., CardSoft, (assignment for the Benefit of Creditors), LLC v. VeriFone, Inc., 807 
F.3d 1346, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“[I]t is not enough that the district court may have heard 
extrinsic evidence during a claim construction proceeding—rather, the district court must have 
actually made a factual finding in order to trigger Teva’s deferential review.”); Shire Dev., LLC v. 
Watson Pharm., Inc., 787 F.3d 1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (finding that although the district 
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observing: “As all parties agree, when the district court reviews only evidence 
intrinsic to the patent (the patent claims and specifications, along with the 
patent’s prosecution history), the judge’s determination will amount solely to 
a determination of law, and the Court of Appeals will review that construction 
de novo.”136 
Even if the trial court considered the extrinsic evidence relevant and 
found facts on the basis of that evidence, if the Federal Circuit thinks that 
consideration of extrinsic evidence was unnecessary because the intrinsic 
evidence is sufficient on its own, it will ignore it on appeal and review the 
claim interpretation de novo based solely on the intrinsic evidence.137 
Another way that the Federal Circuit sidesteps trial court factfinding 
based on extrinsic evidence is to hold that the extrinsic evidence amounts to 
improper testimony as to a legal conclusion. Again, the Supreme Court 
arguably invited this approach in Teva: “‘[E]xperts may be examined to 
explain terms of art, and the state of the art, at any given time,’ but they 
cannot be used to prove ‘the proper or legal construction of any instrument 
of writing.’”138 On remand in Teva, a split Federal Circuit panel again held the 
same claims invalid for indefiniteness without finding clear error in any of the 
trial court’s findings based on extrinsic expert testimony. 139 These findings 
played no apparent role in the majority’s de novo analysis of the meaning of 
the claim language because the majority coded as questions of law all the 
determinations that matter: “The meaning one of skill in the art would 
attribute to the term molecular weight . . . is a question of law . . . . 
Determining the meaning or significance to ascribe to the legal writings which 
constitute the intrinsic record is legal analysis.”140 Yet in a revealing sign of 
ambiguity as to whether its analysis amounted to legal conclusion or appellate 
factfinding, the majority recited “that claim 1 is invalid for indefiniteness by 
 
court received expert testimony in evidence, “there is no indication that the district court made 
any factual findings that underlie its [claim] constructions”). 
 136. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831, 840–41 (2015). 
 137. E.g., Microsoft Corp. v. Proxyconn, Inc., 789 F.3d 1292, 1297 (Fed. Cir. 2015) 
(reviewing claim construction de novo and declining to consider “findings on [extrinsic] evidence 
because the intrinsic record [was] clear”), overruled on other grounds by Aqua Prods., Inc. v. Matal, 
872 F.3d 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
 138. Teva Pharm., 135 S. Ct. at 841 (quoting Winans v. N.Y. & Erie R.R. Co., 62 U.S. 88,  
101–02 (1858)). 
 139. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 789 F.3d 1335, 1342–45 (Fed. Cir. 2015). The 
Supreme Court’s decision in Teva was one of two decisions that it handed down at the same time 
on the related issues of claim interpretation and the statutory requirement of claim definiteness. 
See 35 U.S.C. § 112(b) (2012). In Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., the Court “h[e]ld that a 
patent is invalid . . . if its claims, read in light of the specification delineating the patent, and the 
prosecution history, fail to inform, with reasonable certainty, those skilled in the art about the 
scope of the invention.” Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 572 U.S. 898, 901 (2014). The 
Federal Circuit considered the impact of both decisions on remand in Teva.  
 140. Teva Pharm., 789 F.3d at 1342.  
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clear and convincing evidence.”141 If the evidence matters, it is troubling that 
the appellate court reached its decision while ignoring extrinsic evidence that 
the trial court considered as to the meaning of the claim language to a person 
having ordinary skill in the art. Nor is it necessary, as review for clear error 
would still allow the Federal Circuit to reverse based on its review of both 
extrinsic evidence and intrinsic evidence in a proper case. 
One can sympathize with the impulse of the Federal Circuit to engage in 
active appellate review of claim interpretation by trial courts. Surely claim 
interpretation presents functional challenges for generalist trial courts 
adjudicating patent cases. One way to address this challenge is to use experts. 
Federal Circuit judges might also benefit from considering expert testimony 
in the record rather than ignoring it. Whatever their expertise in patent law, 
they cannot pretend to have expertise in the meaning of technical language 
to persons of skill in the art for all (or even most) of the patents that come 
before them. As Judge Newman observed in her dissenting opinion in 
Markman, “when the technologic issues are complex, appellate fact finding is 
probably the least effective path to accurate decisionmaking. . . . Appellate 
briefs and fifteen minutes per side of attorney argument are not designed for 
de novo findings of disputed technologic questions.”142 
So long as legal standards for claim interpretation require analysis from 
the perspective of a person of skill in the art, it behooves the courts to consult 
extrinsic evidence to access that perspective rather than to rely on their own 
inexpert reading of patent documents. If the credibility of hired experts is in 
doubt, that argues for deference to the tribunal that is in a better position to 
assess witness credibility rather than for ignoring that evidence on appeal. 
That, after all, is a traditional functional justification for reviewing trial court 
findings based on witness testimony for clear error rather than de novo.143 
Another functional consideration favoring de novo review is the interest 
in uniformity of claim interpretation. The Supreme Court cited this interest 
as a reason to assign claim interpretation to judges rather than juries in 
Markman, noting that uniformity would encourage innovation by providing 
certainty to both the patentee and potential infringers about the reach of the 
patent.144 Although intuitively appealing, this interest may be overstated. 
Different lawsuits may raise different interpretive questions about the same 
patent. In addition to citing different prior art, different defendants may use 
different allegedly infringing technologies, raising distinct issues of validity 
and infringement that test claim boundaries in different ways and call for 
 
 141. Id. at 1345. A dissenting panel member thought the majority’s conclusion was 
inconsistent with the district court’s factual findings, which were not clearly erroneous. Id. at 1346 
(Mayer, J., dissenting). 
 142. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 999 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc) 
(Newman, J., dissenting). 
 143. FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a)(6); see also Cooper, supra note 48, at 650–51 (explaining Rule 52). 
 144. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 390–91 (1996). 
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further claim interpretation. When the exact same issue arises again, issue 
preclusion may bind the parties to the prior action, including the patent 
owner.145 If the initial determination is treated as a legal conclusion, stare 
decisis could also bind nonparties.146 On the other hand, if later proceedings 
raise new interpretive questions, the prior claim interpretation may not be 
dispositive even with stare decisis effect.147 
A related concern is that parties who can get away with making 
inconsistent arguments about claim interpretation in different proceedings 
may offer distorted claim interpretations for strategic purposes, but if they will 
have to live with the same claim interpretation in the future, they may be more 
cautious.  
Whatever the potential benefits of uniformity, de novo review comes at a 
significant cost.148 Because claim interpretation lurks behind every other 
ruling on validity and infringement, the prospect of de novo review makes the 
outcome of patent litigation uncertain until appeals have been exhausted. 
Such delays are particularly costly in patent litigation because patents are 
wasting assets with expiration dates, and because further technological 
change could be stalled by uncertainty as to the validity and scope of patent 
rights. 
The discussion so far has focused on Federal Circuit review of claim 
interpretation in the district courts. The Federal Circuit uses essentially the 
same approach in reviewing claim interpretation in PTAB adjudications, with 
the difference that it reviews factual findings that draw on extrinsic evidence 
for substantial evidence rather than for clear error. In both contexts, the 
Federal Circuit reviews the ultimate claim construction de novo.149 And in both 
contexts, the Federal Circuit often avoids deferential review of evidentiary 
underpinnings by concluding that the intrinsic evidence is sufficient to 
interpret the claims without considering extrinsic evidence.150 When the 
 
 145. Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 349 (1971); Phil-Insul 
v. Airlite Plastics Co., 854 F.3d 1344, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
 146. In Markman, the Supreme Court recognized this point. Markman, 116 S. Ct. at 1395. 
Subsequent Federal Circuit decisions have sometimes used the term “stare decisis” in giving 
binding effect to the Federal Circuit’s own prior interpretation of claim language. E.g., Ottah v. 
Fiat Chrysler, 884 F.3d 1135, 1139–40 (Fed. Cir. 2018); Miken Composites, L.L.C. v. Wilson 
Sporting Goods, Co., 515 F.3d 1331, 1338 n.* (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 147. See, e.g., Phonometrics, Inc. v. N. Telecom, Inc., 133 F.3d 1459, 1464 (Fed. Cir. 1998) 
(finding that where prior decision construed only the phrase “digital display” in the claim, dictum 
concerning meaning of other claim language “has no issue preclusive effect”). 
 148. See Jeffrey A. Lefstin, Claim Construction, Appeal, and the Predictability of Interpretive Regimes, 
61 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1033, 1035 (2007). 
 149. Microsoft Corp. v. Proxyconn, Inc., 789 F.3d 1292, 1297 (Fed. Cir. 2015), overruled on 
other grounds by Aqua Prods., Inc. v. Matal, 872 F.3d 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
 150. E.g., In re Smith Int’l, Inc., 871 F.3d 1375, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2017); Microsoft Corp., 789 
F.3d  at 1297–99 (concluding on de novo review that the PTAB’s claim interpretation of disputed 
term was “unreasonably broad” without considering its “findings on [extrinsic] evidence because 
the intrinsic record is clear”). 
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Federal Circuit interprets the claims de novo without reaching the extrinsic 
evidence, the difference between substantial evidence and clear error does 
not matter. 
Functional considerations argue for more deference to claim 
interpretations by the PTO than to claim interpretations by trial courts. After 
all, the PTO has considerable expertise in patent claims. Patent applicants 
draft claim language in accordance with conventions and requirements that 
the PTO has established and codified in its rules.151The judges that make up 
PTAB panels are required by statute to “be persons of competent legal 
knowledge and scientific ability.”152 Moreover, the functional argument for 
deference is even stronger for PTAB rulings than for PTO decisions in the 
course of patent prosecution because PTAB panels have more time and 
resources available than PTO examiners, allowing them to do a more 
thorough job.153 
Until recently, one important difference between claim interpretation in 
proceedings within the PTO (including PTAB adjudications) and claim 
interpretation in patent infringement litigation stood in the way of 
uniformity. Consistent with longstanding practice in other PTO proceedings, 
the PTAB gave claim language “its broadest reasonable construction in light 
of the specification . . . in which it appears” (broadest reasonable 
interpretation or BRI),154 while the Federal Circuit requires district courts to 
give claims their “ordinary meaning . . . as understood by a person of skill in 
the art.”155 The courts granted Chevron deference to the PTO’s choice of the 
BRI standard as within the scope of its statutory authority to promulgate 
regulations governing IPR proceedings.156 The Federal Circuit reviewed the 
PTAB’s claim interpretations under this standard for reasonableness in light 
of the intrinsic evidence.157 
Because BRI may lead to a broader interpretation than ordinary 
meaning, and because broader claims are more likely to impinge on prior art 
and therefore fall to a validity challenge, the BRI standard made it easier to 
invalidate patent claims in PTAB proceedings than in district court 
 
 151. 37 C.F.R. § 1.75 (2018). 
 152. 35 U.S.C. § 6(a) (2012). 
 153. Dreyfuss, supra note 9, at 260. 
 154. 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). 
 155. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). 
 156. See Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2142–44 (2016). 
 157. Microsoft Corp. v. Proxyconn, Inc., 789 F.3d 1292, 1298 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (stating that 
the BRI does not permit giving claims an interpretation that is “unreasonable under general claim 
construction principles” (emphasis removed)), overruled on other grounds by Aqua Prods., Inc. v. 
Matal, 872 F.3d 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2017).  
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litigation.158 The difference in standards frustrated uniformity.159 Prior 
judicial interpretations of claim language under an ordinary meaning 
standard were not binding in PTAB proceedings,160 and prior PTAB 
interpretations under the BRI standard were not binding in the courts.161  
The PTO recently changed its claim construction standard for AIA PTAB 
adjudications to conform to the standard used in district court litigation.162 In 
announcing the new rule, the PTO cited a study reporting that 86.8% of 
patents at issue in AIA adjudications are also in litigation in the courts, and 
asserted that use of the same claim interpretation standard would promote 
uniformity and predictability across these proceedings.163 The PTO also noted 
concern that unfairness could result from using a broader standard of 
interpretation in AIA adjudications, leading to invalidations based on a 
broader claim scope than the patent holder could assert in an infringement 
action.164 With the change in standard, the PTAB will now consider prior 
constructions of the claim from federal courts,165 and the PTO noted that the 
change “increases the likelihood that courts may consider the PTAB’s 
construction for a given patent.”166 
This is a welcome development that recognizes that the PTAB plays a new 
and different role in AIA adjudications of validity challenges than the PTO 
played in the past.167 At one time, it could be argued that the PTO’s role was 
to perform an initial sorting function for a large volume of patent 
applications, most of which would prove inconsequential, while leaving it to 
the courts to analyze more thoroughly down the road the validity of the subset 
 
 158. As Justice Breyer noted in Cuozzo Speed Technologies, the difference in claim 
interpretation standards (preponderance of the evidence versus clear and convincing evidence) 
creates a risk of inconsistent interpretations by the PTAB and district courts in proceedings 
between the same parties involving the same patents. Cuozzo Speed Techs., 136 S. Ct. at 2144. 
 159. See Niky R. Bagley, Note, Treatment of PTAB Claim Construction Decisions: Aspiring to 
Consistency and Predictability, 32 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 315, 355–57 (2017). 
 160. Knowles Elecs., LLC v. Iancu, 886 F.3d 1369, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (stating that 
although “previous judicial interpretations of disputed claim term may be relevant to the PTAB’s 
later construction of that same disputed term” under BRI, the “[PTAB] is not generally bound 
by a previous judicial interpretation” under a different standard (citing Power Integrations, Inc. 
v. Lee, 797 F.3d 1318, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2015))).  
 161. SkyHawke Techs., LLC v. Deca Int’l Corp., 828 F.3d 1373, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (finding 
that the PTAB is not bound by district court decisions using different claim construction standards). 
 162. See Changes to the Claim Construction Standard for Interpreting Claims in Trial 
Proceedings Before the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, 83 Fed. Reg. 51,340, 51,340 (Oct. 11, 
2018) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 42). 
 163. Id. at 51,342 (citing Saurabh Vishnubhakat et al., Strategic Decision Making in Dual PTAB 
and District Court Proceedings, 31 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 45 (2016)). 
 164. Id.  
 165. 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b) (2018). 
 166. Changes to the Claim Construction Standard for Interpreting Claims, 83 Fed. Reg. at 51,349. 
 167. Cf. Dreyfuss, supra note 9, at 260 (justifying the use of BRI and preponderance of the 
evidence standard in PTAB proceedings as allowing “[PTAB] decisions [to] do what the 
examiners would have done had they had the PTAB’s extra time, resources, and expertise”). 
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of patents that matter enough to generate litigation.168 The BRI standard may 
have been good enough for this rough first cut. But the new AIA PTAB 
proceedings are instead an alternative forum for adjudicating validity of the 
patents that matter at the litigation stage. Rather than relying on the rough 
and ready shortcuts of examiners, these proceedings combine process 
features of litigation with the expertise and efficiency of an expert agency to 
do the job better, more quickly, and at lower cost. 
This change could potentially give PTAB claim interpretations preclusive 
effect in infringement litigation between the same parties.169 So far, however, 
the primary impact of PTAB claim interpretations has been on PTAB validity 
rulings. When the Federal Circuit reverses a PTAB claim interpretation, 
reversal of the validity ruling often follows, even when the validity ruling was 
based on factual findings entitled to deferential review (such as lack of 
novelty).170 The scope of review of claim interpretation is thus a highly 
consequential issue. 
It remains to be seen what impact the change in claim interpretation 
standards in PTAB adjudications will have on Federal Circuit deference to 
PTAB rulings on this issue. To the extent that the Federal Circuit sees claim 
interpretation as a legal conclusion regardless of the lower tribunal, it may 
continue to use the same standard of review for PTAB claim interpretations 
that it applies to claim interpretations by district courts, with marginally 
greater deference towards factfinding by the PTAB in the rare case in which 
such factfinding matters. 171  
On the other hand, perhaps some members of the Federal Circuit shared 
the perception noted by the PTO that the BRI standard was unfair and led to 
invalidation of patents that would have survived validity challenges if 
interpreted using the approach of the courts in infringement actions.172 
Perhaps this impression led to closer appellate scrutiny of PTAB rulings 
applying the BRI standard, and perhaps the change to the claim 
interpretation approach that the Federal Circuit prefers will give the Federal 
 
 168. Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1495, 1495–96 (2001). 
 169. Cf. B&B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1293, 1310 (2015) (applying 
issue preclusion in trademark infringement action to decision of the Trademark Trial and Appeal 
Board in an opposition proceeding that found confusing similarity between two marks). 
 170. E.g., Homeland Housewares, LLC v. Whirlpool Corp., 865 F.3d 1372, 1378–79 (Fed. 
Cir. 2017). 
 171. As discussed previously, the Supreme Court’s requirement for greater deference to 
PTAB factfinding rarely matters because of the Federal Circuit preference for reliance on 
intrinsic evidence which it reviews de novo. See supra notes 130–41 and accompanying text. 
 172. See, e.g., In re Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC, 793 F.3d 1268, 1291 (Newman, J., dissenting). 
Former Chief Judge Randall Rader famously referred to the PTAB as “death squads killing 
property rights” in a speech before the AIPLA in 2013. Rob Sterne & Gene Quinn, PTAB Death 
Squads: Are All Commercially Viable Patents Invalid?, IP WATCHDOG (Mar. 24, 2014), http:// 
www.ipwatchdog.com/2014/03/24/ptab-death-squads-are-all-commercially-viable-patents-invalid.  
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Circuit greater confidence in the fairness of PTAB proceedings, making it 
more willing to defer to PTAB rulings. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The Federal Circuit is scrupulous about articulating standards of review, 
but it is open to question how much these formal standards really matter. 
Consideration of recent decisions suggests that Federal Circuit review of 
district court rulings on nonobviousness has become more deferential, 
although its articulation of the standard of review has not changed.173 While 
reciting the same standard, a reviewing court has considerable latitude to 
review with greater or lesser deference depending on its own assessment of 
what is appropriate. As law and institutions evolve, that judgment might 
change. 
When Congress first created the Federal Circuit, it expressed a policy in 
favor of clarifying and standardizing patent law and making its application 
more uniform and predictable.174 Active judicial review allowed the Federal 
Circuit to establish its dominance in patent law and to refine its general 
standards into bright-line rules,175 while close judicial oversight of case-
specific rulings allowed it to reinforce its policy preferences on the ground. 
The Federal Circuit maximized its opportunities for active review by coding 
rulings that apply general legal rules to the facts of particular cases as legal 
conclusions subject to de novo review on appeal.176 And given the limitations 
of generalist trial courts and busy examiners, active appellate review may have 
seemed like a sensible approach to a specialized appellate court concerned 
with quality control.  
Many things have changed in the 35 years since the Federal Circuit was 
first created. The Supreme Court overturned many of the Federal Circuit’s 
bright-line rules for achieving uniformity in favor of greater tolerance for 
variation in the application of standards depending on case-specific 
considerations.177 The larger the role of case-specific considerations, the 
stronger the functional argument for deference to lower tribunals that are 
immersed in the specifics of the case, and the weaker the argument for de novo 
review to elaborate on generalizable legal rules. And of particular relevance 
to judicial review of PTAB decisions, Congress sought to address concerns 
about patent quality not by enlarging the role of the Federal Circuit, but by 
 
 173. See supra notes 75–78 and accompanying text. 
 174. Dreyfuss, supra note 24, at 3–4. 
 175. Rai, supra note 7, at 1103–10; see also Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, Percolation, Uniformity, and 
Coherent Adjudication: The Federal Circuit Experience, 66 SMU L. REV. 505, 509–20 (2013) (stating 
that the Supreme Court has reversed many bright line rules created by the Federal Circuit in 
recent years in favor of more flexible standards). 
 176. Rai, supra note 7, at 1057–65. 
 177. Dreyfuss, supra note 175, at 512–13. 
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providing for administrative adjudications of validity challenges before the 
PTAB.  
Congressional marching orders for separating the wheat from the chaff 
in the patent system have shifted under the AIA, with implications for the 
scope of judicial review. Yet formal standards of review from an earlier era 
remain locked in place.  
In this new environment, de novo review of PTAB rulings on case-specific 
matters seems like a waste of judicial resources that conflicts with legislative 
priorities. It encourages costly and time-consuming appeals and threatens to 
undermine the effectiveness of the AIA in providing a quicker, cheaper, and 
more expert alternative to district court litigation. As its caseload rises, the 
Federal Circuit would do better to confine its use of de novo review to 
generalizable legal rulings that provide guidance to the PTAB and the courts 
in future matters, rather than attempting to replicate the work of the PTAB 
from the appellate bench on routine rulings on claim interpretation and 
obviousness. 
